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Keep Your Eye on Your Ball:
Patent Holders’ Evolving Duty to Patrol the
Marketplace for Infringement
By Aaron B. Rabinowitz∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Obtaining a patent is a significant undertaking – preparing and filing a patent
application can cost thousands of dollars.1 Securing a patent, however, is frequently a
fruitful investment. Aside from insuring the uniqueness of their own products, firms
derive significant revenue through the licensing2 and auctioning of their patents.3 Once a
patentee has obtained his patent, however, must he perform an ongoing investigation of
the marketplace in order to enforce that patent against alleged infringers? The concept of
policing one’s property is well-known in trademark law in which trademark owners must
patrol the marketplace for infringers or risk the loss of their trademarks.4
∗

Associate, Woodcock Washburn LLP, Philadelphia, PA. Former law clerk to the Honorable Franklin S.
Van Antwerpen, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2005-2006, and to the Honorable Jan
E. DuBois, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2004-2005. The views
and opinions presented in this Article are the author’s alone and are not necessarily those of the author’s
current or past employers. The author would like to thank Aliza Rabinowitz for her keen editing skills and
her patience during the writing of this article and Hal Fullmer for his thoughtful suggestions.
1
Obtaining a patent in the United States costs, on average, $11,000. Ellen L. Rosen, Corporate America
Sending More Legal Work to Bombay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, § 10; see also Raymund Flandez, A
Step-By-Step Guide to Getting a Patent, WALL ST. J. ONLINE – STARTUPJOURNAL.COM, May 10, 2005,
http://www.startupjournal.com/howto/ip/20050510-flandez.html#correx (depending on complexity, patent
application costs can range up to as much as $10,000 or even $50,000).
2
As an example, Texas Instruments, a global-scale producer of microelectronics, generates more revenue
through licensing its intellectual property than through sales of actual products. Seth Shulman, Owning the
Future, 2 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 193 (2000); see also Competition and Intellectual Property Law and
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Hearing Before the FTC and Dep’t of Justice (June 3, 2002)
(statement of Frederick J. Telecky, Jr., Senior Vice President and General Patent Counsel, Texas
Instruments) at 5 (“Patent licensing is the most common use for patents in the semiconductor industry.”),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228telecky.pdf.
3
In 2006, Ocean Tomo, an intellectual property consulting firm, organized and held a patent auction which
resulted in the sale of 31 patent portfolios for a total of $8.4 million. Michael Kanellos, Patent auction
pays more in the end, CNET NEWS, May 10, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Patent+auction+pays+more+in+the+end/2100-1014_3-6070799.html?tag=st.ref.goo.
4
See, e.g., Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2003) (“When a senior
user delays in enforcing its rights, a junior user may acquire a valid trademark in a related field, enforceable
against even the senior user.”); see also E-Systems, Inc. v. Monitek, Inc., 720 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1983)
(ruling against trademark holder in infringement suit and observing that plaintiff’s delay of six years in
filing infringement suit against defendant despite constructive notice of defendant’s alleged infringement
demonstrated plaintiff’s lack of diligence in enforcing trademark).

Vol. 5:2]
¶2

¶3

¶4

Aaron B. Rabinowitz

Patentees’ obligation to police their patents is somewhat less clear, but it is
evident that patentees may not sleep on their rights. If sued for patent infringement, an
alleged infringer may assert the equitable defense of laches against the patentee for his
failure to diligently police his patent.5 If successful, the laches defense bars the patentee
from obtaining infringement damages that accrued before filing suit.6 To successfully
invoke the laches defense, a defendant must prove two things: (1) that “the plaintiff
delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time the
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant”7 and,
(2) the defendant “suffered injury or material prejudice attributable to the delay.”8 A
delay of at least six years raises a presumption that the delay was prejudicial to the
defendant.9
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Wanlass v. General Electric Co.10 and Wanlass
v. Fedders Corp.11 – decided ten days apart by the same panel of judges – are the leading
cases from that court addressing the application of the laches defense. Although both of
these cases concluded that patentees have some duty to police the marketplace for
infringement, the cases reached different conclusions on similar facts regarding the scope
of this duty. The dissonance between General Electric and Fedders has created problems
for district courts seeking to apply a consistent rule in laches cases, and district courts
adjudicating laches cases have themselves reached contradictory results on similar facts.
In addition to the confusion that the General Electric and Fedders decisions create for
district courts, the decisions also create a more pressing problem for patentees. Patentees
are left with conflicting guidance that precludes them from creating a laches-proof
program for policing their patents in the marketplace.12
An additional reason to clarify the metes and bounds of the laches defense is the
emergence of so-called patent licensing companies known as “patent trolls.”13 Such
companies typically do not intend to produce their patented inventions and instead derive
5

See Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Although the defense does not also bar the patentee from prospective relief. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
7
Id. at 1032.
8
Id. at 1028. As is explained in Part II.A infra, the prejudice aspect of the laches inquiry is outside the
scope of this article.
9
Id. at 1028; Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, 921 F.2d 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
10
148 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
11
145 F.3d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12
Id. at 1468 (Rader, J., concurring) (“Unfortunately, patentees, potential infringers, and courts will have
difficulty applying the laches doctrine in light of [Fedders] and General Electric.”). Being precluded from
obtaining pre-suit damages represents a significant loss to a patentee, damages available in infringement
suits total in the tens of millions of dollars. See William M. Bulkeley, Patent litigants pose growing threat
to business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05257/571396.stm.
13
One court has described a patent troll as “‘somebody who tries to make a lot of money off of a patent that
they are not practicing and . . . [have] never practiced.’” Overstock.com v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment,
Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367
(2005)); see also Joe Nocera, Tired of Trolls, A Feisty Chief Fights Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at C1
(noting that the New Jersey Law Journal described patent trolls as “existing solely to exact a tax”); see also
David G. Barker, Note, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, 2005
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 7 (2005), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0009.html.
6
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revenue solely by threatening litigation against marketplace participants who market
products that, arguably, infringe the patent troll’s patent.14 While no decision has
addressed the application of laches to a business that operates purely as a patent troll, the
existence of such businesses15 means that such a case is a near-certainty.
This article will highlight the current contours of the laches defense as applied to
patent law cases and identify the unresolved issues raised by recent cases involving the
laches defense. First, this article will summarize the current state of Federal Circuit law
governing the application of laches to patent law cases by reviewing that court’s two
leading cases on this issue. Second, this article will identify the inconsistencies between
these two cases and will highlight the difficulty that district courts have experienced in
adjudicating laches cases.16 Finally, this article will propose a solution by which the
Federal Circuit can clarify its laches jurisprudence and provide more solid guidance for
patent holders and accused infringers alike.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Equitable Defense of Laches

¶6

¶7

At its core, laches is an equitable defense18 that, if successful, bars a patenteeplaintiff from recovering any damages incurred before the initiation of his infringement
suit.19 To make out a claim of laches, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that “(1) the plaintiff delayed filing suit an unreasonable and inexcusable length
of time after the plaintiff knew or should have known of its claim against the defendant;
and (2) the delay resulted in material prejudice or injury to the defendant.”20 The
defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie claim of laches and bears the
burden of persuasion throughout the litigation.21
The length of time that constitutes an unreasonable delay depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case.22 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has held that a
presumption of laches arises if the plaintiff delayed suit for more than six years from the
date of the patent’s infringement.23 With the benefit of this presumption, the defendant
14

Patent trolls, however, exist as distinct from intellectual property licensing firms. Patent trolls typically
do not develop, manufacture, or practice their patented inventions before threatening litigation, whereas
intellectual property licensing firms may engage in research and development activities, obtain patents on
the products they develop, and then license their patented technology to other firms in the marketplace in
lieu of manufacturing and selling the patented products themselves.
15
While the number of patent trolls is difficult to calculate, patent trolls are sufficiently prevalent that their
existence is a matter of Congressional concern. See Overstock.com, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
16
See infra Part III.A.
17
See infra Part III.B.
18
“Laches is a clement doctrine. It assures that old grievances will some day be laid to rest, that litigation
will be decided on the basis of evidence that remains reasonably accessible and that those against whom
claims are presented will not be unduly prejudiced by delay in asserting them.” A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 481 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
19
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
20
Gasser Chair Co., Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032.
21
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 1038.
22
Gasser Chair, 60 F.3d at 773.
23
Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035-
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need not prove that the delay was unreasonable or that it suffered material or other
injury.24 Critical to evaluating the first laches factor – and the focus of this article – is
whether the patentee knew or should have known of the alleged infringer’s activity
before filing an infringement suit.25 This is frequently a fact-intensive inquiry and as
such, “does not warrant mechanical rules.”26
B. Federal Circuit Laches Decisions: Wanlass v. General Electric and Wanlass v.
Fedders
¶8

The Federal Circuit’s laches jurisprudence is shaped by two 1998 cases, General
Electric and Fedders. While both cases dealt with similar facts and were decided by the
same panel of judges, the panels in each case reached very different results.
1. Wanlass v. General Electric

¶9

In General Electric, plaintiff Wanlass obtained a patent in 1977 for a single-phase
electric motor useful in air conditioners that used a run capacitor.27 Wanlass offered
defendant General Electric a license on his motor in 1977. General Electric refused,
stating that it did not believe Wanlass’s idea was new, and continued to use run
capacitors in certain situations and was enthusiastic about such use.28 After General
Electric rejected the license offer, Wanlass abandoned the claimed single-phase motor
and focused instead on other types of motors.29 Between 1977 and 1982, Wanlass tested
certain General Electric air conditioners for infringement, and the results of these tests
were negative.30 Wanlass performed no additional testing of General Electric products
until 1992, at which time his testing suggested infringement.31 Wanlass then filed suit
against General Electric in 1995, alleging that General Electric made and sold infringing
products before 1995.32
¶10
On summary judgment, General Electric asserted the defense of laches.33 The
district court found for General Electric, concluding that because Wanlass knew or
should have known of General Electric’s alleged infringement for more than six years
before filing his infringement suit in 1995, the court presumed that the delay was
unreasonable and that General Electric was prejudiced by that delay.34 Wanlass argued
36).
24
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028; PSN Ill., Inc. v. Ivoclar Viadent, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 902, 906 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
25
Gasser Chair, 60 F.3d at 773; Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
26
PSN Ill., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 907; IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1156,
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] court must consider the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand .
. . ”); see also John B. Campbell, Jr., A Decade of Aukerman: An Analysis of Laches and Estoppel in the
Federal Circuit, 43 IDEA 299, 319 (2003) (“Whether constructive knowledge will be imputed depends on
the facts of each case.”).
27
Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1336.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1336-37.
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that the six-year period should have run from the time he had actual knowledge of
General Electric’s infringement – i.e., sometime in 1992 – because tests he carried out
between 1977 and 1982 showed no infringement.35 The district court rejected this
argument.
i) General Electric Majority Opinion
¶11
On appeal, a divided Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court, concluding
Wanlass failed to meet his obligation to police the marketplace for potentially infringing
single-phase run capacitor motors.36 The majority based its decision primarily on (1)
Wanlass’s apparent willful blindness to General Electric’s allegedly infringing activities,
and (2) the apparent ease with which Wanlass could have tested General Electric’s
products after 1982.37
¶12
First, the General Electric majority identified patentees’ duty to patrol the market
for infringement of their patented products: “[t]he availability of delay based on
constructive knowledge of the alleged infringer’s activities imposes on patentees the duty
to police their rights.”38 Expanding this duty beyond mere inspection of products, the
majority stated that a patentee could be held to have constructive knowledge of
infringement “even where he has no actual knowledge of the sales, marketing,
publication, public use, or other conspicuous activities of potential infringement if these
activities are sufficiently prevalent in the inventor’s field of endeavor.”39 Regarding the
depth to which a patentee ought to investigate the marketplace, the majority stated that a
“reasonable patentee, motivated by his interest in recovering for and preventing
infringement, keeps abreast of the activities of those in his field of endeavor.”40 The
majority reasoned that patentees were properly charged with the burden of seeking out
infringers because, “compared to potential infringers, [patentees] are in the best position
to know the scope of their patent protection and, therefore, also to know likely places to
find infringement.”41 The majority also reasoned that by virtue of their “superior
knowledge . . . [patentees] would incur comparatively lower costs in investigating
potentially infringing activities.”42
¶13
Turning to the facts of the case, the majority concluded that although Wanlass had
determined in the late 1970s that General Electric was not infringing his patent, Wanlass
nevertheless had a duty to conduct future investigations of General Electric products even
after his initial testing disclosed no infringement.43 The majority believed Wanlass’s
failure to continue to investigate General Electric’s products was particularly egregious in
light of General Electric’s rejection of Wanlass’s 1977 offer to license the single-phase
run capacitor and General Electric’s stated intent to continue to use run capacitors in its
own products.44 The majority also concluded the infringement testing at issue was not so
35

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1340-41.
37
Id. at 1339.
38
Id. at 1338.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1339.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1339.
43
Id. at 1339.
44
Id. at 1339-40 (“[General Electric]’s clear intention to employ run capacitors to improve motor efficiency
36
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burdensome or expensive so as to excuse Wanlass from performing such tests.
Furthermore, without citing any record evidence, the majority stated that testing the
allegedly infringing products at issue would have been “easy and inexpensive,” such that
Wanlass’s failure to perform any testing from 1982 to 1992 was deemed unreasonable.45
ii) General Electric Dissenting Opinion
¶14
Judge Rader dissented from the majority opinion in General Electric, criticizing
the majority opinion on several grounds.46 First, Judge Rader opined that the majority
erred by construing General Electric’s 1977 statement to Wanlass that General Electric
planned to use run capacitor motors as placing Wanlass on notice of General Electric’s
potential infringement.47 Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Wanlass – the
non-moving party – Judge Rader observed that because Wanlass had tested General
Electric’s products from 1977 to 1982 and did not discern any infringement, Wanlass had
been “lulled into the belief” that General Electric would not infringe and thus had no
obligation to continue testing.48
¶15
Second, Judge Rader criticized the majority’s conclusion that Wanlass was
obligated to perform testing because the testing was “easy and inexpensive.” Judge
Rader observed that discovering the 1986 change in General Electric’s products that
allegedly infringed Wanlass’s patent would have required Wanlass to investigate all
appliances that used such motors, including air conditioners and refrigerators.49 Judge
Rader reasoned that because there was no evidence in the record regarding the cost and
difficulty of testing all such motors contained within the range of appliances, the case
should have been remanded to the district court for fact finding regarding the cost of such
testing.50
¶16
Finally, Judge Rader stated that the majority had created too broad a testing
burden, arguing the majority had “[placed] upon patentees the duty to test any product
that might contain the claimed invention.”51 Judge Rader also noted that the majority’s
requirement that patentees test and re-test overlooked the notice function of patent claims
and failed to account for the “fundamental principle that the public has a duty to avoid
infringement.”52

renders Wanlass’s inference that [General Electric] would not infringe his patent unreasonable.”). The
majority also rejected Wanlass’s argument that he did not know which of General Electric’s products to
test, reasoning that if Wanlass were uncertain regarding which of General Electric’s products might
infringe, “the natural course of action would have been to examine [General Electric] motors from time to
time to determine whether they had begun to use run capacitors in an infringing way.” Id. at 1340.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1341 (Rader, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Judge Rader also criticized the majority’s reliance on an
undated memorandum Wanlass wrote to one L.E. Potempa, believing the memorandum was ambiguous
and did no more than create a question of material fact regarding when Wanlass actually learned of General
Electric’s alleged infringing activities. Id. at 1341 n.* (Rader, J., dissenting).
47
Id. at 1341.
48
Id. at 1341-42.
49
Id. at 1342.
50
Id at 1343.
51
Id. Judge Rader also noted that in the case of inventions – like Wanlass’s – that had “broad potential
application,” the majority’s rule would place a “significant burden” on patentees. Id.
52
Id. (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader further opined that the majority’s imposition of a broad
obligation to police the market would cause patentees to “over-invest in patent enforcement,” and thus shift
their resources from research and development to less-productive legal matters. Id.
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2. Wanlass v. Fedders
¶17

In Fedders, the Federal Circuit considered another infringement suit by plaintiff
Wanlass, this time against the Fedders Corporation for alleged infringement of the same
patented motor at issue in General Electric.53 After obtaining his patent, Wanlass
attempted to license the motor to several companies active in the air conditioning
industry, each of which declined Wanlass’s offer.54 Following industry-wide rejection of
his invention, Wanlass shifted his focus to a different type of motor.55 In 1995, Wanlass
learned that “numerous companies” had infringed his 1977 motor patent and filed suit
against Fedders.56 In 1997, Fedders moved for summary judgment on a laches defense.57
¶18
The district court granted Fedders summary judgment on its laches defense,
concluding that Wanlass’s delay in initiating suit was unreasonable.58 The district court
did so based on evidence that (1) Fedders was a well-known brand within the air
conditioner industry; and (2) Wanlass knew during the 1980s that Fedders made room air
conditioning units that may have used single-phase electric motors.59 The district court
construed this evidence as implying that Wanlass knew that the Fedders single-phase
motors were covered by his patent. 60
i) Fedders Court Opinion
Like the court in General Electric, the Fedders court acknowledged at the outset a
patentee’s duty to police the marketplace and investigate potentially infringing products.61
Bearing this in mind, the Fedders court then vacated the district court’s summary
judgment decision on the ground that the district court’s central conclusion – that
Wanlass knew Fedders sold air conditioners containing single-phase electric motors that
might infringe his single-phase motor patent – was not supported by the conflicting
evidence.62
¶20
In doing so, the Fedders court identified several facts which, when read in the
light most favorable to Wanlass, supported the inference that Wanlass was not aware of
Fedders’s infringing activities.63 First, the court observed that Wanlass himself was not
active in the air conditioning industry, thus demonstrating that Wanlass was unaware of
the activities of other participants in that market.64 Second, the court noted that while
single-phase motors were used in air conditioners, there was no evidence suggesting all
single-phase motors infringed Wanlass’s patent or that Fedders’s advertisements for
¶19

53

Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1463-64.
59
Id. at 1465.
60
Id. at 1464-65.
61
Id. at 1466 (“[Patentees can] not simply ignore any and all evidence of potentially infringing activity . . .
[Patentees] have a duty to investigate a particular product if and when publicly available information about
it should have led [them] to suspect that product of infringing.”) (emphasis added).
62
Id. at 1467-68.
63
Id. at 1464-67.
64
Id. at 1464.
54
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single-phase motor air conditioners were sufficiently detailed so as to place Wanlass on
notice that the Fedders products might infringe.65
¶21
In addition to criticizing the district court’s findings regarding Wanlass’s
knowledge of Fedders’s products, the Fedders court also criticized the district court on
the separate ground that the district court’s decision imposed an inappropriately onerous
testing burden on patentees.66 Acknowledging that single-phase motors were frequently
used in air conditioners, the court observed that merely because single-phase motors were
used in air conditioners did not also mean that all single-phase motors infringed
Wanlass’s patent.67 The court went on to state that policing the air conditioning industry
and its products for infringing single-phase motors would “require testing of an unknown
number of models,” and that imposing such a duty on Wanlass to monitor the air
conditioning industry by testing an indeterminate number of air conditioning units would
be “unreasonable.”68 The court then observed that the district court, by charging Wanlass
with a duty to inspect all air conditioners that contained single-phase motors, had
imposed just such an unreasonable duty.69
¶22
The Fedders court also considered the cost of the testing program the district
court believed was required of Wanlass and noted Wanlass did not have the financial
resources necessary to purchase and dismantle every air conditioner on the market and
test the single-phase motors found inside such units.70 The court observed that Wanlass’s
affidavit was contrary to the district court’s implicit finding that a program for testing all
air conditioners of all manufacturers was both economically viable and easily
performed.71
ii) Fedders Concurrence
¶23
Judge Rader – the dissenting judge in General Electric – filed a concurring
opinion in Fedders, emphasizing that General Electric did not stand for subjecting
patentees to a “broad duty to test all potentially infringing goods,”72 but that Fedders
correctly concluded that patentees were not subject to a sweeping duty to test.73 Judge
Rader also criticized the General Electric majority – again – for concluding that the

65

Id. at 1465.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. The Fedders majority also distinguished two cases on which the district court had relied, Hall v.
Aqua Queen Manufacturing, 93 F.3d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co.,
Nos. 73-C-136, 73-C-793, 73-C-139, 73-C-140, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531 (N.D. Ill. April 16, 1976).
In Hall, the defendant successfully raised the laches defense in part on the ground that the plaintiff – a wellknown figure in the waterbed industry – had attended trade shows at which the defendant’s product was
present and thus had knowledge of the defendant’s allegedly infringing waterbed product. Unlike the
plaintiff in Hall, Wanlass was not active in the air conditioning industry, nor did he receive industry
publications. Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1467. Faulkner was distinguishable on the ground that there was a
well-developed evidentiary record on which the district court in that case could base its ruling, whereas the
record in Fedders was not so complete. See id. at 1467.
72
Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1468 (Rader, J., concurring).
73
Id. (“I join this opinion to the extent that it explains that the duty created in General Electric is not as
sweeping as the language of that opinion suggests.”).
66
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patentee in that case was on notice of the defendant’s allegedly infringing activity.74
Finally, Judge Rader noted that Wanlass similarly had no duty to test Fedders’s products
and ultimately concluded that “patentees, potential infringers, and courts will have
difficulty applying the laches doctrine in light of this opinion and General Electric.”75
iii) Fedders Dissent
¶24
Judge Mayer dissented in Fedders, arguing that because Wanlass admitted to
knowing that single-phase motors were used in air conditioners, Wanlass was thus
obligated to test products in that market.76 Judge Mayer also noted the circuit diagram
for the infringing compressor was “substantially similar” to the circuit diagram for a
compressor that Fedders had openly produced since 1973, a similarity Judge Mayer
believed obligated Wanlass to test Fedders’s products.77
III. DISCUSSION
¶25

As discussed, the panels in General Electric and Fedders confronted cases
involving similar facts but reached diverging conclusions as to whether the laches
defense applied. While both cases identified a duty to police, the General Electric and
Fedders courts placed varying limits on this duty. As this section of this article will set
forth, the two decisions are inconsistent in three ways: first, the extent of a patentee’s
duty to patrol an industry; second, the frequency and degree with which a patentee must
investigate potentially infringing products; and third, the degree to which a competitor’s
assurance of non-infringement relieves a patentee of his duty to investigate. In addition
to describing district courts’ difficulties in applying the Federal Circuit’s decisions, this
section of the Article also proposes a solution to the uncertainty created by the Federal
Circuit.
A. Uncertainty Created by General Electric and Fedders
1. Scope of Duty

¶26

As discussed, the General Electric majority imposed a broad duty, from which
flows that the General Electric patentee had a duty to monitor the air conditioning
industry.78 From this it follows that the General Electric patentee had a duty to monitor
all products in which his patent might potentially be used.79 However, this conclusion
74

Id. at 1468-69 (quoting majority opinion); see also id. at 1465 n.3 (majority opinion) (comparing record
in Fedders, which lacked evidence of any communication between Wanlass and alleged infringer, with
record in General Electric, which demonstrated General Electric had rejected Wanlass’s offer to license run
capacitor motor technology but still intended to use such run capacitor technology in its own products).
75
Id. at 1468 (Rader, J., concurring).
76
Id. at 1469-71 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 1470-71.
78
Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (deeming General Electric’s sale of run
capacitor-containing air conditioners as sufficiently “open and notorious” so as to trigger Wanlass’s duty to
inspect).
79
Id. at 1339-40 (rejecting patentee’s argument that he should not have had to test defendant’s products
because he did not know which of defendant’s products might be infringing); see also id. at 1343 (Rader, J.
dissenting) (observing that General Electric majority rule would obligate patentees to test “any product that
might contain the claimed invention.”) (emphasis added).
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arguably overlooked Wanlass’s lack of active participation in the air conditioner
industry,80 despite the Federal Circuit’s pre-General Electric decision in Hall v. Aqua
Queen Manufacturing, Inc., which obligated patentees to police entire industries for
infringing products only when the patentees themselves were active participants in that
industry. 81 By contrast, the court in Fedders reached a different conclusion, by carefully
considering the facts in that case and recognizing Federal Circuit precedent in Hall.82
The Fedders court refused to charge the patentee with a duty to police an industry in
which he was not involved.83 It observed that Hall required a patentee to police an entire
industry only when the patentee was an active participant in the industry 84 and it noted
that there was a dispute over whether the Fedders patentee was an active participant in
the air conditioning industry.85
¶27
In the wake of these decisions, Hall and Fedders made clear that patentees who
do not actively participate in a market are not obligated to police it, but district courts
have struggled with the related question of whether a patentee’s knowledge that a
competitor exists necessarily obligates the patentee to investigate that competitor’s
products. 86 In Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat, the District of Minnesota concluded that
“[k]nowledge of a competitor in the market does not prove knowledge that the competitor
is selling infringing products.”87 The District of Delaware reached a similar conclusion in
Acushnet Co. v. Dunlop Maxfli Sports Corp.,88 where that court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the “plaintiff had a duty to police its competitors’ [products] for
infringement.”89 However, the Central District of California90 reached a different result in
Ultimax Cement Manufacturing. v. CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp.,91 where that court
granted the defendant’s laches motion, concluding that the “[defendant’s] competition in
the rapid hardening cement market should have heightened [plaintiff’s] vigilance.”92
80

See id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting) (observing that the record in General Electric did not evidence
Wanlass’s notoriety; “Wanlass can hardly be described as a prominent figure in the . . . industry.”).
81
See Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (imposing duty on patentee to
police waterbed industry because patentee had attended trade shows where allegedly infringing products
were on open display and patentee had been “a central and active figure [in the industry] for at least eight
years”).
82
Fedders, 145 F.3d 1461.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1467 (citing to Hall, 93 F.3d at 1552).
85
See id. at 1463 n.1 (noting that record insufficient to decide whether or not Wanlass “remained active in
the air-conditioning industry”).
86
See Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1097 (D. Minn. 2001) (concluding that patentee’s
sixteen-year absence from meter-reading market relieved patentee of obligation to inspect and test products
in market).
87
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1465 (“the mere fact that single-phase motors are used
in room air conditioners is not enough to suggest infringement because not all single-phase motors
infringe”)).
88
Acushnet Co. v. Dunlop Maxfli Sports Corp., Civ. A. No. 98-717-SLR, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123
(D. Del. June 29, 2000).
89
Id. at *40.
90
The Central District of California handles more patent infringement cases than any other court in the
United States. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, §
3, at 1.
91
Ultimax Cement Mfg. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., SA CV 02-578, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29580 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 6, 2004).
92
Id. at *49 (emphasis added); see also Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 911, 920 (E.D.
Va. 1996) (“[L]ack of direct competition between Odetics and Storagetek is insufficient to excuse Odetics’
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Thus, district courts have been unable to resolve consistently whether the mere
existence of a competitor triggers a patentee’s duty to police that competitor’s products.
Given that a patent on a basic technology or technique may have broad application across
a range of industries,93 it is essential for the Federal Circuit to clarify whether the
existence of a competitor obligates a patentee to investigate that competitor’s products.94
2. Depth and Frequency of Investigation

¶29

¶30

General Electric and Fedders also left unanswered the question of how searching
an investigation a patentee must perform once he learns of potential infringement.
Further, these decisions left open the related question of how often a patentee must re-test
after an initial test or round of tests discloses no infringement.
i) Depth of Investigation
Under General Electric and Fedders, the sufficiency of an infringement
investigation is based on a court’s judgment regarding the economic burden and technical
difficulty of testing potentially infringing products.95 The General Electric majority
believed that once a patentee was on notice of potential infringement, he was obligated to
perform testing of the alleged infringer’s products, 96 which encompassed eight to nine
hundred products costing on average two hundred dollars each.97 Although the majority
deemed this level of expense and effort reasonable, the majority did not address what
level of expense and effort would be unreasonable,98 stating only that testing should be “a
function of [its] cost and difficulty.”99 By contrast, faced with the identical situation of a
patentee alleging infringement by a participant in the large air conditioner market, the
Fedders court observed that “[i]mposing a duty upon [the patentee] to monitor the air
conditioning industry by periodically testing all others’ products . . . would be
unreasonable.”100 Read together, these decisions create a sliding scale under which the
required degree of testing is roughly proportional to its cost and difficulty.101
[sic] failure to investigate the Storagetek product”) (emphasis added) (pre-Fedders case).
93
Cf. Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (requiring
patentees whose inventions have “broad potential application” to patrol a broad range of products or
markets would be “a significant burden”).
94
In doing so, the Federal Circuit may have to address the threshold question of what constitutes a
“competitor” for laches purposes. As an example, while Intel and A are competitors in the
microelectronics field, would A, which produces microchips for use in cellphones, be considered a
competitor to B, which assembles and sells the cellphones themselves, merely because they both participate
in the cellphone industry?
95
See Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1340 (“The frequency with which these types of investigations should have
occurred is a function of their cost and difficulty.”); cf. Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1465 (“[T]here is an
inadequate basis for the district court’s implicit finding that a program for testing all air-conditioners of all
makers was feasible and affordable and otherwise a reasonable burden.”).
96
Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1336 (“Testing [these] products for infringement . . . is both easy and
inexpensive.”); id. at 1339 (describing General Electric products as “easily testable”).
97
Id. at 1336, 1339.
98
Id. at 1342-43 (Rader, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 1340 (majority opinion).
100
Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The Fedders
decision did not, however, discuss whether testing competitors’ products would have been overly
technically demanding.
101
Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1340; Ultimax Cement Mfg. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., SA CV 02-578 AHS,

202

Vol. 5:2]

Aaron B. Rabinowitz

¶31

District courts have applied this sliding scale without notable difficulty.
Addressing the adequacy of a patentee’s investigation into alleged infringement, district
courts conclude that where discovery of infringement would require a highly-technical
inspection of the allegedly infringing products that would involve instrumentation, such
investigation exceeds what is required to defeat a laches defense.102 Thus, the general
rule on adequacy of investigation that emerges is the counterintuitive rule that that the
more complicated the product, the less investigation need be performed. 103
¶32
While this rule has some intuitive appeal, the Federal Circuit’s sliding scale may
create an imbalance between patentees of different sizes and financial capabilities. As an
example, a high-technology firm with a patented microprocessor would likely be excused
from performing a thorough investigation of a competitor’s allegedly infringing
microprocessor because examining a microprocessor for possible infringement is
technically complicated and costly.104 By contrast, a low-technology firm with a patent
on a desk chair would likely be obligated to investigate a competitor’s product because
any infringement would likely be apparent on the face of the product.105 Thus, those
firms who participate in low-technology markets are, in some sense, held to a higher
investigatory burden than those firms who participate in high-technology markets. This
is potentially inequitable because high-technology markets may hold greater potential
financial gain for their participants than do low-technology markets. Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit’s rule would not require high-technology firms to perform costly, detailed
investigations of their competitors’ products.
¶33
Accordingly, until the Federal Circuit clarifies its rule, high-technology firms are
essentially excused from investigating allegedly infringing high-technology products.
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29580, at *49 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (“feasibility or expense of testing is a factor
in determining if a patentee conducted an adequate investigation”) (citing General Electric); Symbol
Techs. Inc. v. Proxim Inc., No. Civ. 01-901-SLR, 2004 WL 1770290, at *4 (D. Del. July 28, 2004) (citing
Fedders) (suggests proposition that testing that goes beyond “low cost detection” methods exceeded
permissible burden on patentees).
102
See PSN Ill., Inc. v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (declining to
impose testing burden on ground that infringement of patented dental implant material could be determined
only by “microscopic examination” of material and “the law does not require such involved investigation
by a patentee” (citing IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1161 (N.D. Cal.
2004))); see also IXYS, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (concluding that patentee is not obligated to test
defendant’s products for infringement where doing so could be accomplished only by “slic[ing] the
[accused] device open and examin[ing] its component structure under a microscope”). However, the courts
in these cases did not discuss whether such in-depth examinations might be required where the defendant
marketed only one or two potentially infringing products, as opposed to ten or one hundred such products.
103
Some commentators have argued that courts should consider a patentee’s size and financial resources as
a factor in deciding what level of investigation that patentee is obligated to perform in the market. See
Paula D. Heyman, Note, The Laches Defense in Wanlass v. General Electric and its Effect on Patentees’
Duty to Police Their Rights, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1151, 1183 (2000) (observing that policing an entire
industry is “a large task for a big corporation and an almost impossible task for an individual,” and
suggesting that such a policing obligation would force employees to “spend much of their time looking
around the industry for infringement and therefore, neglect the business”). This argument, however, does
not consider that all patentees, regardless of size, receive the same level of review from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the same legal protections from their patents. Given that all
patentees are obligated to periodically pay maintenance fees to the USPTO after a patent issues, it follows
that all patentees should also be obligated to police equally their patents in the relevant markets.
104
E.g., IXYS, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (declining to require patentee to slice open allegedly infringing
microelectronics product and examine product under microscope).
105
E.g., Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1336 (charging patentee with knowledge of infringement where
discovering infringement would have been “easy and inexpensive”).
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This may have the unintended consequence of allowing such firms to avoid laches
defenses without also bearing the economic burden of performing costly, technical
examinations of potentially infringing products.
ii) Frequency of Investigation
Related to the depth with which a patentee must investigate an allegedly
infringing product is the frequency with which the patentee must perform such an
examination. In General Electric, the majority concluded that although the patentee did
not discover infringement through his initial tests of the defendant’s products, he was
nevertheless obligated to continue his testing.106 Further, even after his initial round of
testing disclosed no infringement, the General Electric court declined to explain when, if
ever, a patentee’s duty to test would have ceased.107 Given that the patentee tested, found
no infringement, and did not receive any information that would have given him reason
to re-test, the General Electric majority’s conclusion that the patentee was nonetheless
obligated to continue testing is a curious one.108 The court in Fedders did not reach the
question of re-testing, but the Fedders concurring opinion stated that where initial testing
discloses no infringement, the patentee had no duty to continue testing the defendant’s
products “until he received additional information that would cause a reasonable person
to believe that [the defendant] had started infringing his patent.”109
¶35
Unlike the General Electric majority opinion, the reasoning of the Fedders
concurrence is both consistent with Federal Circuit precedent and reaches a practical
result. First, the Fedders concurrence is consistent with the reasoning of Gasser Chair
Co. v. Infanti Chair Manufacturing Corp., in which the Federal Circuit observed that the
plaintiff was under no obligation to take action against a defendant initially thought not to
infringe.110 The Fedders concurrence is also sensible because constructive knowledge of
infringement may be triggered by newly-available information that suggests
infringement.111 This is a more practical conclusion than that reached in General
Electric, which required patentees to commit resources to testing and then re-testing
products even where there was no new information suggesting infringement.
¶36
In IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Technology, Inc.,112 the Northern District of
California addressed the question of what triggers a duty to re-test, and although the IXYS
court it did not explicitly cite the Fedders concurrence, the court seems to have followed
¶34

106
Id. at 1339. (“Determining that [the defendant] was not infringing his patent in the late 1970’s did not
absolve [the patentee] of his duty to conduct future investigations.”).
107
Id.; see also id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Yet this court requires Wanlass to check and recheck
[the motors] for infringement, even if he had early indications that a company was not infringing.”).
108
Cf. id. at 1343 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that case should be remanded for determination of
“whether [the patentee’s] decision to cease testing was reasonable in light of all the circumstances.”).
109
Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., concurring).
110
See Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (plaintiff’s delay in
filing suit reasonable where defendant allegedly told plaintiff in 1979 that defendant would not infringe
patent and plaintiff did not have constructive knowledge of infringement until 1986).
111
See Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1338-39 (imputing constructive knowledge of infringement where party fails
to act on “readily available information”); see also Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1465 (observing that, contrary to
district court’s conclusion, there was no evidence that defendant’s advertisements suggested to plaintiff that
defendant’s products were infringing).
112
321 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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the concurrence’s reasoning.113 IXYS held that although the patentee was under no
obligation to perform testing of the allegedly infringing product due to the complicated
testing of a complex product,114 once the patentee performed tests that suggested
infringement, the patentee became obligated on the basis of the test information to re-test
the defendant’s products for possible infringement.115 Thus, at least one district court has
sensibly applied the approach from Fedders that requires re-testing of allegedly
infringing products only where new information suggests possible infringement.
3. Assurances of Noninfringement as Relieving Patentees’ Duty to Investigate
¶37

An additional issue raised in General Electric is that the decision failed to resolve
whether a patentee may rely on a defendant’s assurances of non-infringement to excuse a
failure to investigate. The General Electric majority concluded that General Electric’s
refusal to license Wanlass’s patent and General Electric’s statement that it believed that
run capacitors like the patentee’s were a “good idea” should have placed the patentee on
notice of potential infringement.116 The General Electric majority, however, failed to
accord proper weight to General Electric’s reports “characterizing Wanlass’s motor
design as neither new nor advantageous,” 117 which reports could be interpreted as
criticizing Wanlass’s invention, not expressing intent to infringe it. Thus, read in the
light most favorable to Wanlass, General Electric’s reports criticizing his invention
should have been construed as showing General Electric’s disinterest in Wanlass’s
invention and as an assurance of non-infringement, not as placing Wanlass on notice of
General Electric’s possible future infringement. To ignore General Electric’s criticism of
Wanlass’s invention is inconsistent with prior Federal Circuit precedent in Gasser
Chair,118 and, furthermore, is arguably inconsistent with the basic equities of the laches
defense in that a defendant should not benefit from false assurances of noninfringement.119
¶38
Given the confusion regarding the representations of non-infringement in General
Electric, district courts have encountered difficulty in deciding whether a defendant’s
assurances of non-infringement excuse a patentee from further obligation to investigate
that defendant. As an example, the court in PSN Illinois, Inc. v. Ivoclar Viadent, Inc.,120
113

Id.
Id. at 1161.
115
Id. at 1162 (“[A]fter these experiments, [the patentee] almost surely had actual knowledge (and
unquestionably had constructive knowledge) that [the defendant’s] products allegedly infringed its
patents.”).
116
Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d at 1336.
117
Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).
118
Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating district
court’s grant of laches defense to defendant at summary judgment on ground that district court failed to
draw reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor).
119
E.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“a
patentee may be able to preclude application of the laches defense with proof that the accused infringer was
itself guilty of misdeeds toward the patentee”); see also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Proxim Inc., No. Civ. 01801-SLR, 2004 WL 1770290, at *4 (D. Del. July 28, 2004) (“An infringer cannot cloak its activities in
secrecy and simultaneously accuse the patent holder of failing to adequately protect its rights.”) (citing
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 670 F.Supp. 861, 868-69 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev’d on other
grounds by 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
120
398 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
114
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denied the defendant’s laches motion, noting that the defendant had falsely assured the
plaintiff of non-infringement and prevented the plaintiff from learning more about the
defendant’s product.121 By contrast, the plaintiff in Ultimax Cement alleged that the
defendant had assured him that the defendant was not infringing the plaintiff’s patented
rapid-hardening cement.122 Nevertheless, the Ultimax Cement court granted the
defendant’s laches motion over the plaintiff’s allegation of false assurances of
noninfringement.123 Although other factors were present in Ultimax Cement,124 it is
unclear why the court in that case declined to view the defendant’s assurances of noninfringement in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
B. Proposed Solution
¶39

As discussed, the Federal Circuit’s articulation of the laches defense in General
Electric and Fedders leaves unanswered the scope of the doctrine, and district courts
have, at times, struggled to apply the doctrine in light of these decisions. One way to
articulate a patentee’s duty and provide additional guidance to courts and litigants is to
collapse the various aspects of the laches inquiry into a single formulation. This
formulation might read as follows:
Based on information that is available to the patentee relating to specific
products either on sale or in development, the patentee must act in a
manner reasonably calculated to discover infringing and potentially
infringing uses of the patented invention in markets into which a
reasonable person in the patentee’s position would have reason to believe
that his invention might have application.

¶40

It is suggested that this formulation may assist in clarifying the boundaries of the
laches defense. First, this formulation addresses the issues of actual and constructive
notice by making clear that a patentee’s duty to investigate is triggered only when
information relating to potentially infringing products becomes publicly known.125 This
may resolve the tension created by General Electric’s holding that patentees must re-test

121

Id. at 910 (plaintiff alleged that he received “false assurances of non-infringement from defendant and
that his attempts to gain more information on the [allegedly infringing] product were rebuffed by
defendant”); see also Symbol Techs., 2004 WL 1770290, at *4 (“[T]he infringer’s activities are relevant to
whether the patentee’s conduct was reasonable, including the infringer’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of
its processes and its denials of infringement.”); Aguayo v. Universal Instruments Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d
699, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“It was not unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on Universal’s denial that the
CVS+ infringed in forgoing investigation into whether the PSV, which Universal identified as the successor
to the CVS+, infringed.”).
122
Ultimax Cement Mfg. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., SA CV 02-578 AHS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29580,
at *50 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004).
123
Id.
124
For example, the plaintiff in the case had demonstrated his invention to defendant personally. Id. at
*48-49.
125
Such a formulation is akin to the novelty inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), which denies
patentability to inventions that are described in printed publications either before the date of invention or
more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006). See, e.g., In re
Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (denying patentability where invention at issue was described in
publicly-available doctoral thesis more than one year prior to patent application filing date).
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products for infringement even after an initial round of testing discloses no infringement
and nothing existing in the record suggests that the patentee had any subsequent reason to
suspect infringement.126 Second, this formulation would impose on patentees a duty only
to investigate suggestive information that relates to the existence of specific products – as
opposed to knowledge that relates only to the mere existence of competitors. By doing
so, the formulation prevents patentees from having to investigate a competitor’s products
simply because those products are from a competitor.127
¶41
Third, the “reasonably calculated to discover” component of the formulation
ensures that patentees – regardless of the industry in which they participate or the
complexity of the product at issue – are not excused from testing potentially infringing
products merely because doing so would require a labor-intensive and costly disassembly
of the product in question.128 Finally, the proposed formulation places a limit on the
scope of a patentee’s duty to police infringement in that a patentee would not be required
to test every possible product that might incorporate his invention.129 Instead, a patentee
would only be required to test those products that might foreseeably incorporate his
patented invention.130
¶42
This formulation also addresses patent trolls and their strategy of lying in wait
until a target company with significant financial resources appears in the marketplace.131
By obligating patentee-patent trolls to police markets into which a reasonable patent troll
would expect to find his patented inventions, this formulation would obligate patent trolls
to police the numerous markets in which they might find infringers. Because patent trolls
by nature seek targets in a wide range of obscure markets, this formulation has the
advantage of preventing patent trolls seeking to avoid a target's laches defense from
arguing that they did not expect to find their target in a particular market.132 By forcing
patent trolls to police broader markets with vigor, patent trolls would then identify
infringers more quickly. In turn, patent trolls who sought to avoid a laches defense
would be forced to initiate litigation more quickly without the lying-in-wait period that
often characterizes such actions.133 Further, because the litigation would be initiated

126

Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
See Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1097 (D. Minn. 2001); see also Odetics, Inc. v.
Storage Tech. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 911, 920 (E.D. Va. 1996) (“[T]his lack of direct competition between
Odetics and Storagetek is insufficient to excuse Odectics’ [sic] failure to investigate the Storagetek product
. . . .”).
128
See supra Part III.A.2.a and associated notes (discussing sliding-scale testing burden imposed under
Gen. Elec. and Fedders).
129
Cf. Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
130
Placing a reasonable limit on the scope of the market that a patentee must survey also serves to conserve
a patentee’s resources for research and development; “[b]y placing an extra incentive on patentee, [the
General Electric] decision will prompt patentees to over-invest in patent enforcement.” Gen. Elec., 148
F.3d at 1343 (Rader, J. dissenting).
131
See Barker, supra note 12, at 7 (“[C]orporate patent trolls purchase patents and do not enforce them until
the relevant industry has grown up around the patent.”).
132
Cf. Overstock.com v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D. Utah 2005) (describing
patent trolls as “lurk[ing] in the shadows”) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 75, E1160-01 (daily ed. June 8, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Berman)).
133
See id. (characterizing patent trolls as lying in wait until “step[ping] out of the shadows” and filing
infringement suits) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 75, E1160-011 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Berman)).
127
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more quickly, fewer dollars would be at stake, which in turn would lessen the “tax” that
patent trolls exact on firms in the marketplace.134
¶43
The formulation above does not consider patentees’ financial capabilities in
defining the degree of their duty to investigate. The Federal Circuit made clear in Hall
that lack of financial resources did not excuse delay in filing suit,135 and, similarly, a lack
of financial resources should not excuse a failure to investigate allegedly infringing
products. From an equitable standpoint, individual patentees derive the same bundle of
legal rights from their patents as do multi-national corporations, and it would be
incongruous to accord small inventors the same bundle of rights as large, well-funded
corporations without also holding the small inventors to the same duties as their larger
competitors.136
IV. CONCLUSION
¶44

While it is clear that patentees must police the marketplace for infringement, the
question of how scrupulously patentees must do so is a difficult one, as evidenced by the
Federal Circuit’s contradictory conclusions on similar facts in General Electric and
Fedders. Despite reaching differing final results, General Electric and Fedders make
plain that patentees have a duty to patrol the marketplace and that this duty is triggered by
actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity.137
¶45
However, the decisions diverge on the questions of how and to what degree
patentees must police the industry to avoid a laches defense in an infringement action.
Under General Electric, patentees must inspect essentially all products into which their
inventions might be incorporated, must test all of a competitor’s products that might
infringe, and may not necessarily rely on assurances of non-infringement.138 This holding
creates problems in that it (1) imposes on patentees an ill-defined and practically
unlimited duty to police markets; (2) fails to articulate what level of testing is sufficient;
and (3) charges patentees with testing and re-testing potentially infringing products in a
market, even where doing so would be prohibitively expensive. In addition, General
Electric concluded that patentees may not necessarily rely on a defendant’s assurance of
non-infringement,139 which places a significant burden on patentees and fails to hold
defendants – who have breached their duty not to infringe – accountable for their
representations.140 Thus, while the General Electric decision places an emphasis on
holding patentees accountable for policing their inventions, it also provides room for
infringers to market patented inventions and later mount a successful laches defense.
134

See Nocera, supra note 12.
Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
136
See supra note 103 (discussing illogic of considering a patentee’s financial strength when evaluating
whether testing of competitors’ products is too burdensome).
137
Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d
1461, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
138
Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d 1340.
139
See Gen. Elec., 145 F.3d at 1341-42 (Rader, J., dissenting) (opining that patentee’s initial contact with
defendant “lulled him into the belief that [the defendant] was not interested in his technology and would not
infringe”).
140
See id. at 1343 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting the “fundamental principle that the public has a duty to
avoid infringement”); cf. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (noting maxim that “He who seeks equity must do equity”).
135
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¶46

By contrast, Fedders held that patentees need not police all potentially infringing
products in a market141 and that monitoring an entire industry’s products was an
unreasonable burden to place on a patentee.142 Nevertheless, Fedders, like General
Electric, fails to specify the minimum number of products that a patentee must test for
infringement in order to defeat a laches motion,143 and patentees might point to Fedders
for the proposition that testing more than a few products is too burdensome.
¶47
In the wake of these diverging decisions, district courts have not yet found a
consistent way to evaluate laches motions and, like the Federal Circuit, have reached
different results on similar facts.144 Furthermore, the increasing prevalence of patent
trolls and their tactics of acquiring previously unenforced patents and then filing
infringement suits on unsuspecting market participants underscores the need to clarify the
contours of the laches doctrine so as to provide a clearer way to deal with patent trolls.
¶48
The formulation proposed in this Article provides additional refinement of the
scope of the duty to patrol. Nevertheless, until the Federal Circuit clarifies its laches
jurisprudence and definitively sets forth patentees’ obligations to patrol the marketplace
for infringement, courts will struggle to find a consistent approach to laches cases, and
patentees will remain uncertain about what steps they must take to protect potential
infringement damages from a laches defense.

141

Fedders, 145 F.3d at 1466.
Id. at 1465.
143
Fedders, 145 F.3d 1462; Gen. Elec., 148 F.3d 1334.
144
E.g., compare PSN Ill., Inc. v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(allegations that defendant made assurances of non-infringement defeated defendant’s laches motion), with
Ultimax Cement Mfg. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., SA CV 02-578 AHS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29580, at
*49-50 (allegations that defendant made assurances of non-infringement did not defeat defendant’s laches
motion).
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